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TAXATION

Is an employment-discrimination award taxable?
by L. Scott Stafford

United States of America
V.
Therese A. Burke, et al.
(Docket No. 91-42)
Argument Date:Jan. 21, 1992

ISSUE
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code [26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2)] excludes from a taxpayer's gross income "the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic payments)
on account of personal injury or sickness." In Burke, the
Court will decide whether the amount recovered by plaintiff for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
is excluded from gross income by section 104(a)(2).
FACTS
The taxpayers-Therese A. Burke, Cynthia R. Center, and
Linda G. Gibbs-are female employees of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) and members of the Office and
Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU). In
1984, Judy Hutcheson, a TVA employee, sued TVA under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq.). The OPEIU intervened in the suit on behalf of
the taxpayers and other TVA employees. Hutcheson and
the OPEIU alleged that TVA discriminated against female
employees in 1981 when it adopted new pay schedules that
increased the salaries of male-dominated employee groups
while leaving the salaries of female-dominated employee
groups unchanged or lower. In 1987, prior to trial, TVA settled the case by agreeing to pay $4,200 to Hutcheson and
$5 million to other affected TVA employees based on
length of service and rate of pay The settlement agreement
authorized TVA to withhold federal income taxes and Social Security taxes from the funds distributed to its employees. Based on the distribution formula in the
settlement agreement, Burke received $794.94, Carter
received $927.55, and Gibbs received $572.95. TVA withheld federal income tax and FICA taxes from these amounts
and paid the taxes to the Internal Revenue Service.
L. Scott Stafford is professor of law at University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, 400 West Markham
Street, Little Rock, AR 72201; telephone (501) 324-9444.
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The three taxpayers filed refund claims with the Internal Revenue Service for the federal income taxes withheld
by TVA. After the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the
claims, the three filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that
the amounts received from TVA were excluded from gross
income by section 104(a)(2). The district court characterized the amounts received from TVA as the "recovery of
wage deficiencies" which were not damages for personal
injury within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). 90-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203 (E.D. Tenn. 1990). A divided panel
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 929 F.2d
1119 (6th Cir. 1991). The majority concluded that section
104(a)(2) excludes from income damages for injuries that
are "tort-like in nature," a classification that includes
damages for sex discrimination because "injuries resulting from invidious discrimination, be it on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, or some other unlawful category, are
injuries to the individual rights and dignity of the person."
The dissenting judge argued that section 104(a)(2) did not
apply to a recovery of earned, but unpaid, wages that
would have been taxable if received by the taxpayer in the
normal course of employment.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Although section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income
any damages received on account of "personal injuries,"
the Internal Revenue Service's application of section
104(a)(2) has traditionally distinguished personal injuries
that are physical in nature from personal injuries that are
nonphysical. When dealing with a recovery for physical
injury to the taxpayer, the IRS treats all damages as excludable under section 104(a)(2), including those damages, such
as lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity, that
represent economic injury. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
The Service's approach to damages recovered for nonphysical injury (such as damages for defamation of character, alienation of affection, malicious prosecution, or
employment discrimination) has been different. Instead of
focusing on whether or not the cause of the injury is personal, the Service has analyzed the consequences of the
injury. Damages for injury to the taxpayer's person, such
as pain and suffering or mental distress, are excluded, but
economic injuries, such as lost earnings or damage to
professional reputation, are not. The IRS distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries was accepted by
the Tax Court in two early cases holding that backpay

263

awards for employment discrimination were not excluded
from gross income by section 104(a)(2). Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616 (1975); Coats v. Commissioner, 36

T.C.M. (CCH) 1650 (1977).
Eventually, in Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693
(9th Cir. 1983), which involved the taxability of damages
recovered by an insurance agent from a credit agency that
had misrepresented his credit history, the Ninth Circuit rejected the IRS approach to section 104(a)(2) and held that:
"The relevant distinction that should be made is between
personal and nonpersonal injuries, not between physical
and nonphysical injuries." The Roemer decision, coupled
with mounting criticism of the physical-nonphysical distinction, prompted the Tax Court to meet en banc and
reconsider its acceptance of the IRS view of section
104(a)(2). In Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294

(1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988), which dealt with
a recovery for damages to the taxpayer's professional reputation, the full Tax Court acknowledged that its differing
treatment of physical and nonphysical injury awards was
"analytically irreconcilable" and concluded that "whether
the damages received are paid on account of 'personal injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry"
under section 104(a)(2).
Roemer and Threlkeld transformed the application of
section 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination awards. Instead of separating such awards into nontaxable damages
for injury to person and taxable damages for economic injury, courts began to focus on whether employment discrimination was a "personal injury." The Third Circuit
endorsed the approach of Roemer and Threlkeld in Bent
v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987). There a
teacher denied re-employment in violation of his constitutional right of free speech recovered a sum under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 designed in part to compensate him for lost wages.
The Third Circuit concluded that denial of a civil right was
a personal injury and held that the entire award was excluded by section 104(a)(2). The Third Circuit later extended its holding in Bent to an award for a retaliatory
discharge in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), Byrne v. Commissioner, 883
F.2d 211 (3rd Cir. 1989), and to an award under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 (29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). Rickel v. Commissioner,900 E2d 655
(3rd Cir. 1990).
In Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989),
the Tenth Circuit concluded that an award for damages specifically allocated to backpay resulting from a wrongful discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was nontaxable. The Sixth
Circuit considered the issue in Pistillo v. Commissioner,

912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990), where it ruled that discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was a personal injury. In Burke, the case now
before the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit reached the
same conclusion in a Title VII case.
Two circuit courts of appeal ruled that employment dis264

crimination awards are taxable. The Fourth Circuit held that
section 104(a)(2) did not exclude the recovery of backpay
and liquidated damages under Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act of 1983 [29 U.S.C. § 206(d)]. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). Late last year the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to apply
section 104(a)(2) to an award in a Title VII case. Sparrow
v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434 (1991).
The Supreme Court's decision in Burke will resolve
whether employment discrimination is a "personal injury"
within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). There is considerable support for treating employment discrimination as a
nonphysical personal injury analogous to defamation of
character, alienation of affection, or malicious prosecution.
The Treasury regulations interpreting section 104(a)(2) state
that it applies to an "action based upon tort or tort type
rights." 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c). The term "tort" is defined
in a standard legal reference work as "a violation of some
duty owing to plaintiff,

. .

. generally... (arising) by oper-

ation of law and not by mere agreement of the parties."
Black's Law Dictionary 1489 (6th ed. 1990). Title VII creates a duty not to discriminate against an employee or
prospective employee on the basis of race, sex, national
origin, or religion. Violation of that duty is a tort-type personal injury to the individual rights and dignity of the victim of discrimination. The fact that damages for the injury
are measured by the victim's lost earnings does not alter
the personal nature of the injury.
A 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2) bolsters the conclusion that employment discrimination is a personal injury. The legislative history of the amendment indicates
that Congress was well aware that some courts had applied
section 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination cases. The
original House bill would have made section 104(a)(2) inapplicable to any damages involving nonphysical injury or
sickness, but the amendment ultimately approved by Congress made section 104(a)(2) inapplicable to any punitive
damages involving nonphysical injury or sickness. Section
7641(a) of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 (103 Stat.
2379). By specifically excluding punitive damages in nonphysical injury cases from section 104(a)(2), Congress implied that section 104(a)(2) does apply to compensatory
damages for nonphysical injury including employment
discrimination.
On the other hand, there are several possible grounds
for concluding that employment discrimination is not a
personal injury within the scope of section 104(a)(2). First,
the history of section 104(a)(2) suggests that its exclusion
of damages for personal injury was originally premised on
the notion that the human body is a form of personal capital. Damages received by the taxpayer for the loss of a
limb, even when measured by lost earnings or loss of future earning capacity, are not income because they merely
make up for the loss of personal capital. Damages received
for employment discrimination, however, do more than
simply restore lost personal capital; they represent an inPREVIEW

crease in wealth of the taxpayer that should be taxed.
A second argument against treating employment discrimination as a personal injury is that the victim of employment discrimination who recovers backpay from his
employer is really receiving additional compensation for
work already performed for the employer. The victim of
an automobile accident who is compensated for lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity never performed
work for the person paying the damages. This reasoning
could resolve Burke because the taxpayers did perform
work for TVA, but it cannot be applied to future employment discrimination cases, such as those involving discrimination in hiring or firing, in which the victim
performed no services for the person paying damages.
A third possible basis for concluding that employment
discrimination is not a personal injury is to treat the statutory duty not to discriminate as an implied condition of
all employment contracts. Violation of the duty then becomes a breach of the employment contract, not a tortlike personal injury Again, it may be difficult to apply this
reasoning to future cases where no employment relationship ever exists between the taxpayer and the person paying damages.
The Supreme Court can avoid deciding whether employment discrimination is a personal injury if it adopts
the reasoning of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in a decision that came down after the government filed
its brief in Burke. In Sparrow v. Commissioner,949 F.2d
434 (1991), which involved the taxability of a Title VII
award, the court focused not on the meaning of "personal
injuries" but on the meaning of "damages." Courts grant
two distinct types of remedies: legal relief, by awarding
monetary damages, and equitable relief, by ordering the
defendant to perform one or more acts. The relief available for discrimination in violation of Title VII is equitable in nature. The court can enjoin the employer from
engaging in future discrimination, it can order the reinstatement or hiring of employees, and it can award other
relief, including the payment of backpay. The equitable nature of Title VII relief led the Court of Appeals in Sparrow to conclude that backpay in a Title VII case is not
"damages" and therefore not excluded by section 104(a)(2).
The Supreme Court's decision in Burke will resolve the
current split among the circuit courts of appeal regarding
the taxability of employment discrimination awards. It will
also affect the tax liability of numerous individual taxpayers
who have received or will receive awards in employment
discrimination suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, the Equal Pay Act of 1983, and similar statutes allowing recovery for invidious discrimination in employment.
The decision in Burke may also reduce the amount of
damages awarded in future employment discrimination
suits. The Supreme Court has previously ruled that the
amount of damages awarded by federal courts in suits arising under federal statutes must take into account whether
Issue No. 7

or not the award is taxable. Norfolk & W R.R. v. Liepelt,

444 U.S. 490 (1980). Currently, wage-related employment
discrimination awards are based on the gross amount of
compensation that a victim of discrimination should have
received; no adjustment is made on the grounds that the
award is excluded from gross income. Johnston v. Harris
County Flood Control Dist., 869 12d 1565, 1580 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990); Sears v. Atchi-

son, T &S.E Ry., 749 E2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985). If the Court decides in Burke

that employment discrimination awards are not taxable,
then wage-related awards in future employment discrimination cases may be reduced to reflect the federal income
taxes saved by the victim.
ARGUMENTS
For the United States (Counsel of Record, Kenneth W
Starr,Solicitor General, DepartmentofJustice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 514-2217):

Payments received in settlement of back-wage claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not excluded from gross income under section 104(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code as "damages received

* * *

on ac-

count of personal injuries or sickness."
A. Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income payments
received by individuals that restore the losses they suffer "on account of personal injuries or sickness."
B. The settlement payments received by respondents represent an enhancement of their wealth that is not excluded from income by section 104(a)(2).
1. The back pay awarded to respondents under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented compensation for work already performed.
2. Compensation for work already performed
represents an enhancement of wealth.
3. The court of appeals erred in refusing to apply the
foregoing principles.
For Therese A. Burke, et al. (Counsel of Record,Joseph
E.Finley, 4201 UnderwoodRoad, Baltimore,MD 21218;
telephone (410) 889-5056).
I. The proper inquiry for exclusion under section

104(a)(2) is whether the underlying claim seeks to redress "personal injuries."
A. The statute and regulations exclude "any damages"
defined as any "amounts," received "on account of
personal injuries," and do not distinguish between
recoveries for economic loss and for nonpecuniary
loss.
B. The compensation for either economic loss or nonpecuniary loss that flows from nonphysical personal
injuries is excludable under section 104(a)(2).
C. The fact that compensation for economic loss, such
as back pay, is determined based on salary, does not
turn it into compensation for services rendered
rather than a monetary recovery for loss on account

of personal injury.
II. Title VII involves a tort-type right to be free from invidious discrimination, and such discrimination is a
personal injury that cuts to the heart of one's status as
an equal human being.
A. Claims under Title VII to redress employment discrimination are tort-like claims within the meaning
of 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c).
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B. Because Title VII secures fundamental personal
rights, injuries to those rights are inherently personal injuries.
C. Excluding Title'VII monetary recoveries for the economic loss caused by discrimination from gross income for tax purposes furthers both the purposes
of Title VII and section 104(a)(2).
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